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I. INTRODUCTION
The defense of “inequitable conduct” in patent litigation is rooted 
in equity and derives, not from any legislative formulation or regulatory 
construct, but instead from the principles of “unclean hands.”  In 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co.,
the United States Supreme Court dismissed a case brought by a patent 
owner because the patent in suit and certain related contracts were 
“perjury tainted” and “inequitable conduct impregnated Automotive’s 
entire cause of action.”
1
  The Precision Instrument case and the only two 
* Article was presented at the 12th Annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property 
Law and Policy, The University of Akron School of Law, Mar. 8, 2010. 
** Partner, Sughrue Mion, PLLC. 
 1. 324 U.S. 806, 819 (1945). 
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other earlier decisions
2
 by the Supreme Court to consider an unclean 
hands defense, “involved overt fraud, not equivocal acts of omission.”
3
A. Development of Inequitable Conduct in the Federal Circuit 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s originally narrow focus on 
fraudulent conduct, in the three decades prior to the establishment of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982, the 
defense of inequitable conduct grew, but with inconsistent underlying 
principles.
4
  However, shortly after its creation, the CAFC articulated the 
test for inequitable conduct in J.P Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd. and 
identified two basic criteria:  (1) a threshold level of materiality of 
omitted or false information; and (2) a threshold level of intent to 
deceive the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), both of which must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
5
  If the thresholds of intent 
and materiality are met, “the court must balance them and determine as a 
matter of law whether the scales tilt to a conclusion that inequitable 
conduct occurred.”
6
In an era when patent litigation accelerated at a historic pace, the 
defense of inequitable conduct was pled with such frequency that the 
CAFC in 1988 characterized the defense as a “plague” on the patent 
system.
7
  In order to confine this growing trend, the court clarified the 
requirements for inequitable conduct in Kingsdown Medical Consultants 
Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., by holding that an omission or misrepresentation 
must be material to patentability and must be made with an intent to 
deceive the Patent Office.
8
Kingsdown also required materiality and 
intent to be proven separately by “clear and convincing evidence,” and 
rejected proof of intent based on even “gross negligence.”
9
 2. Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. 
v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944). 
 3. Larson Mfg. Co. of South Dakota, Inc. v. Aluminart Products Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J., concurring). 
 4. See Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent 
Litigation, 7 Harvard J.L. & Tech. 37, 68 (1993) (“[I]t is only a slight exaggeration to say that one 
could find pre-1982 decisions going both ways (i.e., finding or not finding inequitable conduct) on 
almost any set of facts.”). 
 5. 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984), overruled by Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma 
Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 6. Id. at 1560 (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 7. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 8. 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 9. Id.
2
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 5 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol5/iss1/5
10-KASPER_MACROED 4.9.11.DOCM 4/19/2011 9:20 AM 
2011] MANAGING INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 97
Notwithstanding this attempt to tighten the requirements for 
proving inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit in the ensuing years has 
not held to a consistent standard or otherwise issued decisions that 
would reduce the perceived “plague.”  Starting with the early decision in 
Critikon v. Becton Dickinson
10
 and continuing with Novo Nordisk v. 
Bio-Tech General,
11
Ferring v. Barr Labs,
12
 and Aventis v. Amphastar,
13
the Federal Circuit has relaxed the requirement for proving intent.  In 
these cases, the basis for proving an “intent to deceive” has been 
extended to embrace a pure negligence standard (“should have known”) 
and to impute intent solely on the basis of the materiality of the 
information involved.
14
  Moreover, as to materiality, even though the 
PTO established a narrow materiality standard in 1992, the Federal 
Circuit held in Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works that the 
agency rule cannot “supplant” the judicially developed standard.
15
Because inequitable conduct serves as an “atomic bomb remedy” in 
patent litigation,
16
the trend towards pleading inequitable conduct in a 
majority of patent cases has led judges on the Federal Circuit to call for a 
reevaluation of the current standards en banc and a return to the 
principles in Kingsdown, previously clarified en banc.
17
  It has been 
noted that the recent requirement for a “credible explanation” of conduct 
by the patentee  
effectively shifts the burden to the patentee to prove a negative:  that it 
did not intend to deceive the PTO.  This shift is viewed as contrary to 
the basic principle that it is the ‘accused infringer’—not the patentee—
who ‘must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the material 
 10. Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (drawing an inference of intent based on what a person “should have known”). 
 11. Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc., v. Bio-Technology General Corp., 424 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 12. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 437 F. 3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 13. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceticals, Inc., 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 14. See Erik R. Puknys & Jared D. Schuettenhelm, Application of the Inequitable Conduct 
Doctrine After Kingsdown, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 839, 870 (2008). 
 15. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 16. Aventis Pharma, 525 F.3d at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 17.  Larson Mfg., 559 F.3d at 1343 (Linn, J., concurring) (“But in seeming contradiction with 
Kingsdown, a standard even lower than ‘gross negligence’ has propagated through our case law.  
This standard permits an inference of deceptive intent when ‘(1) highly material information is 
withheld; (2)  the applicant knew of the information [and] … knew or should have known of the 
materiality of the information; and (3) the applicant has not provided a credible explanation for the 
withholding.’). 
3
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information was withheld with the specific intent to deceive the 
PTO.’
18
Even if the Federal Circuit moves toward yet another en banc 
consideration of the inequitable conduct doctrine, it has been suggested 
that, absent clear legislative guidance for the courts, the issues may be 
best left for the administrative agency involved.  Citing several U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions relevant to remedies for misconduct before a 
Federal agency,
19
 including perjury and fraud, and highlighting the 
holding in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
 20
 Professor 
John Duffy observed that the “Supreme Court unanimously emphasized 
that administrative process should ‘be left within the discretion of the 
agencies’, because ‘administrative agencies [are] in a better position than 
federal courts or Congress to design procedural rules adapted to the 
peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of the agency involved.’”
21
Professor Duffy identified the possible questions for Supreme Court 
review to include: 
Whether a court may use its inherent powers to hold a patent 
unenforceable because of a failure to disclose information at the 
administrative level:  That the PTO does not require to be disclosed.  
[Digital]  That is “not indispensable to the granting of a patent” and 
“not the basis for [the patent] or essentially material to its issue.”  
[Corona Tire]  Whether there are no allegations of perjury or attempts 
to conceal perjury.  [Precision Instrument]
22
B. Consideration of Inequitable Conduct by the PTO 
In 1977, the PTO promulgated a standard for a duty of disclosure of 
“material information” to the Office as being based on a reasonable 
examiner, that is, “where there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to 
allow the application to issue as a patent.”
23
  The PTO’s commentary to 
 18. Id. at 1344, (quoting Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“This is in tension with the rule in Star Scientific that ‘the inference must not 
only be based on sufficient evidence and be reasonable in light of that evidence, but it must also be 
the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.’” (emphasis in original)). 
 19. ABF Freight System, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 510 U.S. 317 (1994); Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal 
Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
 20. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 21. John Duffy, Hot Topics, The Coming End of Inequitable Conduct (As We Know It), 
presentation at the Association of Corporate Patent Counsel (ACPC) June 2008 Meeting (June 
2008). 
 22. Id.
 23. 37 C.F.R 1.56 (1984). 
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the new Rule 56 stated that this standard “codifies the existing Office 
policy on fraud and inequitable conduct, which is believed consistent 
with the prevailing case law in the federal courts . . . [t]he section should 
have a stabilizing effect on future decisions in the Office and may afford 
guidance to courts as well.”
24
With the increased volume of charges of inequitable conduct in the 
courts during the early 1980’s, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) implemented a procedure for investigating charges of 
fraud in 1986.
25
  However, that procedure was short lived and was 
abandoned in 1988 because “[t]he Office is not the best forum in which 
to determine whether there was an ‘intent to mislead’ and . . . [will not] 
investigate and reject original or reissue applications under 37 C.F.R. § 
1.56.”
26
In 1992, the Office adopted a new text for Rule 56 that abandoned 
the “reasonable examiner” standard
27
 and defined information as being 
material if “(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other 
information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or (2) It 
refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in:  (i) 
Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (ii) 
Asserting an argument of patentability.”
28
Although the PTO established this standard to govern the scope of 
submissions by applicants, the courts have not embraced this definition 
as the basis for determining the materiality prong of inequitable 
conduct.
29
  The failure to use the administrative agency test may raise 
issues that merit resolution by the Supreme Court.
30
 24. Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (January 28, 1977); see also
Christian Mammen, Controlling the ‘Plague’: Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329 (2009). 
 25. MPEP §2004(18) (5th ed. Rev. 3, 1986). 
 26. Mammen, supra note 24, at 1341, quoting MPEP § 2010 (6th ed. Jan. 1995) (suggesting 
that the procedure was officially abandoned in 1995); see also Harry Manbeck, The Evolution and 
Issue of New Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 136, 139-40 (1992). 
 27. Manbeck, supra note 26 (stating that the “reasonable examiner” standard was criticized as 
being “imprecise” and the goal of the new standard was to provide “a more objective set of 
guidelines”).  See also Mammen, supra note 24, at 1337-38. 
 28. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56. 
 29. See Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (adopting the 1984 test in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 
1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 30. See Duffy, supra note 21, at footnote 23. 
5
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C. Underlying Policy Considerations 
Numerous policy considerations underlie any approach to 
inequitable conduct. 
1. Preventing Fraud 
As often observed, the inequitable conduct defense is driven by the 
principle that “[t]he ‘far-reaching social and economic consequences of 
a patent’ give the public a strong incentive to ensure that patents come 
from ‘backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct.’”
31
Certainly, patentees should not be permitted to acquire patents or 
enforce them through common law fraud, as already acknowledged by 
the Supreme Court.
32
  The penalties for inequitable conduct serve as a 
deterrent to dishonest conduct before the PTO,
33
 as they currently 
include the risk that an entire patent, and even members of its family, 
may be held unenforceable.
34
 However, there is an attendant risk that 
applicants and their counsel will be overly conservative and will flood 
the Examiner with prior art that is cumulative or marginally relevant.
35
2. Ensuring Quality Patents 
The full and open disclosure of information to the PTO by 
applicants is essential to ensuring that the Examiner has all relevant 
information available at the time of examination,
36
 and can enhance the 
quality of the granted patents.
37
  A concern for the quality of issued 
 31. Nicole M. Murphy, Inequitable Conduct Doctrine Reform: Is the Death Penalty for 
Patents Still Appropriate?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2274, 2285 (2010). 
 32. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 
819 (1945); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933); Hazel-Atlas Glass 
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944). 
 33. Melissa Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 9 
(2008). 
 34. Mammen, supra note 24, at 1347-48. 
 35. Christopher Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 770-72 (2009). 
 36. Wasserman, supra note 33, at 10-11; see also the AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION REGARDING THE 
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 6, (2009) (“The current duty to disclose material 
information to the PTO under 37 CFR 1.56 should be reemphasized without creating new 
requirements on applicants.  The highest quality examination and the strongest patent protection 
occur when the PTO has all material information at the time patentability decisions are made.  The 
applicant’s disclosure of known material information is critical to a high-quality examination 
process.”). 
 37. Cotropia, supra note 35, at 748-62. 
6
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patents comes from a broad spectrum of the public.
38
  However, over-
compliance by applicants and their attorneys, caused by the fear of 
violating the inequitable conduct doctrine, can result in reduced patent 
quality.
39
3. Reducing Prosecution and Litigation Costs 
The courts have recognized the continuing role of inequitable 
conduct as a “plague” on patent litigation, creating burdens for the 
parties and the judicial system, for more than two decades.
40
  Moreover, 
a study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 2003 concluded 
that the then current rate for assertion of the inequitable conduct defense 
by defendants was excessive and resulted in high litigation costs and 
called for the removal of subjective elements in the patent law, for 
example, those related to inequitable conduct.
41
  It was observed that the 
high cost to comply with enhanced disclosure requirements (e.g., the 
previously proposed disclosure requirements in the form of Examination 
Support Documents under the now withdrawn “claiming rules”) are 
likely to preclude independent inventors and SME’s from protecting 
their ideas.
42
  A report of the Federal Trade Commission based on 
hearings held in the early part of the twenty-first century, observed that 
the “concern that mandatory statements of relevance could give rise to 
dubious allegations is well taken.”
43
4. Avoiding Excessive Punishment, Particularly to Innocent 
Patent Owners 
In contrast to concern for the public or potential competitors of the 
patentee who are disadvantaged by a patent that granted on the basis of 
 38. See Lisa Dolak, Inequitable Conduct: A Flawed Doctrine worth Saving, presented at panel 
Inequitable Conduct:  What Standard?  What Evidence? (Sept. 23, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/lisa_dolak/5. 
 39. Cotropia, supra note 35, at 762-73. 
 40. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceticals, Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349-50 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting); see data published in Mammen, supra note 24, at 19-27. 
 41. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 121-23 
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004). 
 42. Cotropia, supra note 35, at 774 (“The duties under the doctrine should not be expanded to 
include a duty to search or provide relevancy statements.  Such duties are likely to overload the 
examiner, price inventors out of the patent system, shift the burdens of examination away from a 
low cost provider, and destroy the benefits of independent review.”). 
 43. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch.5, p.13 (2003) available at
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovatiorpt.pdf. 
7
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some measure of inequitable conduct, there also is concern for the 
innocent or even negligent participant who makes a mistake in 
submitting misleading or incorrect information to the PTO.  The concern 
is amplified in the case where the patent owner is a bona fide purchaser 
of the patent and had no knowledge of the alleged improper conduct. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA
Given the lack of consistency and clarity with which the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct has been addressed by the courts in the past twenty 
years and on the basis of the recommendations in the reports of the 
National Academy of Sciences and the Federal Trade Commission, the 
United States Congress has included inequitable conduct provisions in 
the several Patent Reform Bills that have been introduced during the past 
six Congressional sessions.
44
  As noted by Christian Mammen in his 
recent article, the bills have provisions that fall into four broad 
categories: 
(1) specifying the prima facie elements of inequitable conduct, 
specifically materiality and intent; (2) specifying the standard of 
pleading or proof in litigation in the courts; (3) changing the range of 
remedies available in the courts; and (4) providing a forum within the 
PTO (rather than the courts) for adjudication of inequitable conduct 
allegations.45
The manner in which each of these categories of provisions would 
be implemented is discussed subsequently with reference to selected 
provisions of the introduced bills and proposed alternatives, which have 
been raised that had been raised. 
Notably, in the 109th Congress, the Honorable Lamar Smith 
introduced H.R. 2795, which included in its section 5 a significant 
treatment of inequitable conduct issues, including:  (1) referral of 
inequitable conduct investigations to the PTO; (2) codification of the 
duty of candor for applicants and attorneys; (3) establishment of civil 
sanctions for inequitable conduct; (4) the provision of a “but for” 
threshold before a patent can be held unenforceable; and (5) the 
 44. American Intellectual Property Law Association Reports, Aug. 7, 2007 (reporting that 
“AIPLA was among the first to develop concrete patent reform proposals more than three years ago 
in responses to Federal Trade Commission and National Academies of Sciences reports on the 
patent system.  Those proposals focused on . . . litigation reforms as to willful infringement and 
inequitable conduct”). 
 45. Mammen, supra note 24, at 1378. 
8
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application of the standard to parties adverse to a patent.
46
  The 
corresponding Senate Bill S. 3818 simply proposed to amend current § 
282 by adding unenforceability as a defense in patent litigation, 
establishing a statutory basis for a court finding a patent unenforceable if 
materiality and intent are proven by clear and convincing evidence, 
precluding unenforceability if at least one claim is not invalid, and 
provided for an exemption if there was a good faith employed.
47
  The 
Senate Bill specifically provided that intent may not be based solely on 
gross negligence or on the materiality of the information misrepresented 
or not disclosed.
48
  The original provisions regarding inequitable 
conduct in the House Bill were significantly altered during markup, 
primarily by deleting significant civil penalties.  Both bills refer to 
intentional deception rather than relying on “knowing and willful 
deception.”
49
  Nonetheless, despite the submission of various 
alternatives by stakeholders, neither bill was passed by the 
corresponding legislative body.
50
In the 110th Congress, there was no treatment of inequitable 
conduct in the originally introduced House legislation (H.R. 1908),
51
 but 
the bill as passed by the House did contain substantive provisions.
52
Similarly, the Senate Bill (S. 1145) originally did not contain any 
provisions for inequitable conduct,
53
 but the bill as passed by the 
Judiciary Committee and reported to the Senate did include certain 
limited provision, including a provision that defined “materiality” on the 
basis of the “reasonable examiner” standard and precluded an “intent to 
deceive the Office” from being based solely on gross negligence or “the 
 46. Patent Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005).  As originally presented, H.R. 
2795 would have changed the duty of candor and unenforceability; established a PTO group to 
determine inequitable conduct where there was no common law “fraud,” and take away most court 
jurisdiction over inequitable conduct but permit civil penalties up to $5M for violations. 
 47. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5(c) (2006). 
 48. Id.
 49. H.R. 2795, § 5(a); S. 3818, § 5(c)(2); AIPLA Reports, supra note 44 (AIPLA advocated 
that, unlike the broader standard adopted in the drafts, unenforceability should depend on a court 
finding that at least one of the asserted claims should not have issued in view of the false or 
withheld information). 
 50. H.R. 2795, § 5, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-2795; S. 
3818, §5(c), available at http://www.govtrackus/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-3818. 
 51. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12 (as introduced in the House, 
Apr. 18, 2007). 
 52. Id. (as passed by the United States House of Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007). 
 53. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Congress (as introduced in the United 
States Senate, Apr. 18, 2007). 
9
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materiality of the information misrepresented or not disclosed.”
54
  It also 
required that inequitable conduct be pled with particularity, but did not 
preclude such pleading until after a first judgment of invalidity of a 
claim is obtained.
55
  Finally, it established specific remedies that a court 
could apply in its discretion.
56
  Subsequently, additional proposed 
amendments to the Senate draft also provided for the elimination of 
inequitable conduct as a basis for invalidity or unenforceability and 
established a reissue process to purge the effects of any misconduct.
57
In addition, an alternative piece of legislation introduced by Senator Kyl 
(S. 3600) did address inequitable conduct and proposed shifting the issue 
from civil litigation to an administrative proceeding before the PTO, 
while also requiring patentees to go to the PTO:  (1) to have the patent 
reissued in order to remove invalid claims; (2) assess the culpability of 
the applicant’s conduct; and (3) impose sanctions on any parties that 
have engaged in inequitable or fraudulent conduct.
58
  However, in 
neither case did a bill get passed by the Senate before the 110th 
Congress ended.
59
Now, in the 111th Congress, neither the original House Bill (H.R. 
1260) nor the original Senate Bill (S. 515) contained any provisions 
dealing with inequitable conduct.
60
  However, inequitable conduct 
 54. Id. § 12 (as passed by S. Comm. On the Judiciary, Jan. 24, 2008); Mammen, supra note 
24, at 1379 (noting that three concerns prompted inclusion of provisions providing a clear standard 
of materiality, a separation of intent from materiality and the provision of discretion to a court to 
select a remedy). 
 55. S. 1145, § 12 (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 24, 2008). 
 56. Id. 
 57. The proposal to limit inequitable conduct was accompanied by proposals to require the 
filing of an Applicant Quality Submission (AQS) that would identify material information and 
explain how the information is relevant to the claimed invention. S. 1145, § 11 (as reported by S. 
Comm. On the Judiciary, Jan. 24, 2008, proposing that patent applicants submit a search report and 
analysis to patentability); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW, REPORT TO HOUSE DELEGATES RECOMMENDATION 107A, available at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/annual/summary_of_recommendations/One_Hundred_Seve
n_A.doc. 
 58. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 11 (2008). 
 59. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145; Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600,
110th Cong. § 11 (2008), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-3600. 
 60. Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, 
S. 515, 111th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate, March 3, 2009).  Interestingly, Senator Hatch’s 
press release of March 3, 2009, advising of the introduction of S. 515 as a jointly sponsored bill of 
Senator’s Hatch (R) and Leahy (D), acknowledging that “we cannot settle for mere codification of 
current practices,” and calling for a “more objective and clearer inequitable-conduct standard [that] 
will remove the uncertainty and confusion that defines current patent litigation” stated,   
[I]f we are serious about enacting comprehensive patent law reform, then we must 
take steps to ensure that  the inequitable-conduct doctrine is applied in a manner 
10
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remained a critical issue in the ongoing discussions of the Patent Reform 
Bills H.R. 1260 and S. 515, with Senator Orren Hatch maintaining 
strong support for legislation focused on inequitable conduct issues.  A 
separate bill (S. 610), introduced by Senator Kyl, included substantial 
provisions regarding inequitable conduct, although they differ somewhat 
from Senator Kyl’s proposals in S. 3600 during the 110th Congress.
61
  S. 
610 precludes invalidity or unenforceability on the basis of misconduct 
before the Office (except for criminal or antitrust violations), and gives 
the PTO power to conduct investigations and levy civil sanctions for 
violations.
62
A “Manager’s Amendment” to S. 515
63
 was released to the public 
on March 4, 2010 as a bill supported on both sides of the aisle and 
includes provisions regarding inequitable conduct
64
 that are an amalgam 
of the recent proposals made in the Senate.  If taken up and passed by 
the Senate, the inequitable conduct provisions in S. 515 still would face 
review and possible modification in the House of Representatives, 
particularly based on input by Judiciary Committee Chair John Conyers 
(D) and Representative Lamar Smith (R).  Any resulting legislation 
could address one or more of the several issues relevant to inequitable 
conduct reform. 
A. Defining Materiality and Intent 
Motivated, at least by the constantly varying standards of intent and 
materiality in the courts, there have been various proposals in Congress 
to establish objective definitions of “materiality” and “intent.”  Congress 
consistent with its original purpose:  to sanction true misconduct and to do so in a 
proportional and fair manner.  Inequitable-conduct reform is core to this bill, as it 
dictates how patents are prosecuted years before litigation.  The inequitable conduct 
defense is frequently pled, rarely proven, and always drives up the cost of litigation 
tremendously.   
“Senators Hatch, Leahy Introduce Patent Reform Act of 2009,” available at 
http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=ce28c
6f0-1b78-be3e-e028-418ea18126e5.  However, the Bill reported out by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee at that time had no provisions for inequitable conduct.  Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 
515, 111th Congress (as reported by the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 2009).  The recent 
Manager’s Amendment to S. 515 filled that gap.  See Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, 
“Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute,” 111th Cong. § 10 (2010), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/PatentReformAmendment.pdf. 
 61. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. § 11 (2009). 
 62. Id.
 63. Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, “Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute,” 111th 
Cong. (2010), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/PatentReformAmendment.pdf. 
 64. See id. § 10, “Supplemental Examination.” 
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has the power to and certain members in both in the House and Senate 
appear to have the inclination to, statutorily define “materiality” and 
“intent.” 
1. Materiality 
The provision governing inequitable conduct in the recent 
Manager’s Amendment to S. 515 does not attempt to define 
“materiality,” perhaps because it is not relevant to the protocol 
established for “purging” most bases for inequitable conduct.
65
However, should such provision be added in the House, the Leahy 
approach to defining “materiality” of information on the basis of a 
“reasonable examiner” standard (important to a reasonable examiner in 
deciding whether to allow the patent application) or the House standard 
(reasonable examiner would have made a prima facie finding of 
unpatentability) may have the best chance of being adopted.  A more 
objective standard that is based upon a patent claim actually being held 
invalid on the basis of the misrepresentation or non-disclosure of that 
information, as proposed in the Kyl draft of S. 3600, is less likely to be 
adopted. 
2. Intent 
As with materiality, the Manager’s Amendment does not include 
any provisions that legislatively define the “intent” factor of inequitable 
conduct because intent would not be relevant to the purging protocol that 
is established.
66
  Nonetheless, should the House attempt to modify the 
Senate’s approach, the resulting provision may be based upon an intent 
that can be inferred, but cannot be based solely on the gross negligence 
of the patent owner or on the materiality of the information 
misrepresented or not disclosed.  More than likely, any circumstantial 
evidence of intent would have to show a “conscious or deliberate 
behavior” in not disclosing material information or submitting false 
information. 
B. Specifying Standard of Proof/Pleading 
The existing standard of “clear and convincing evidence” is not 
addressed in the Manager’s Amendment and is likely to be preserved in 
 65. See id.
 66. See id.
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any legislation regarding the assertion of inequitable conduct as a 
defense under 35 U.S.C. § 282.
67
In contrast to the Leahy bills from the 110th Congress, which 
provided that the defense or claim of inequitable conduct must be pled 
with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 
9(b), the Manager’s Amendment does not address the requirements for 
pleading at all.
68
  When considered by the House, it is possible that 
provisions could be added that restrict the time for pleading inequitable 
conduct to a period after a court has found one or more claims invalid, as 
previously provided in S. 3818 and H.R. 2795.
69
  In any event, since a 
“but for” standard did not find universal support and was opposed based 
on it diluting the valuable role that inequitable conduct plays in 
discouraging fraud, it is not likely to be included in any final 
legislation.
70
C. Changing the Range of Remedies 
H.R. 1908, as passed by the House in the 110th Congress, would 
have required a court to balance the equities and impose remedies 
including:  (1) denying any equitable relief, limiting the remedy for 
infringement to a reasonable royalty; (2) holding the claims in suit or the 
claims affected by the inequitable conduct unenforceable; (3) holding 
the entire patent unenforceable, and/or holding the clams of a related 
patent unenforceable.
71
However, even these remedies may be viewed as too harsh, 
especially for an innocent bona fide purchaser.  Accordingly, the 
Manager’s Amendment uses the ex parte reexamination process under 
35 U.S.C. § 302 et seq. as a vehicle for purging or curing any improper 
conduct.
72
  This approach, coupled with the possibility of intervening 
 67. See id.
 68. See id.
 69. See Patent Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5(a) (2005); see also Patent Reform Act 
of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Congress, § 5(c)(2) (2006).
 70. See Letter from Harry Manbeck to Senators Leahy and Specter (Mar. 10, 2008), 
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog_docs/080310_Manbeck_letter_re_inequitable_conduct.pdf (“I 
believe that the inequitable conduct doctrine should not be changed by legislation so that sanctions 
for misconduct are ruled out just because the patent claims in question are found to be valid.”). 
 71. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12 (as passed by the House, Sept. 
7, 2007). 
 72. Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, “Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute,” § 10; 
111th Cong. (2010), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/PatentReformAmendment.pdf.  Reissue under 35 USC 
§ 251 had been considered as a candidate for a purging protocol; however, reissue requires a 
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rights under 35 U.S.C. § 252, appears to be preferred, although it still 
has limitations that may lead to inefficiencies and inequities and does 
not punish truly fraudulent behavior.   
While the use of “minimum guidelines,” coupled with specified 
judicial discretion, has been proposed as a preferred approach that can 
consider the broad spectrum of conduct,
73
 it has not been adopted in the 
Manager’s Amendment.  It was rejected because the purging protocol 
would remove most bases for the inequitable conduct defense in court or 
before the International Trade Commission in a § 337 proceeding. 
D. Making the PTO the Forum for Investigation and/or Remedy 
Proposals to have the PTO conduct investigations of inequitable 
conduct have been met with skepticism, resulting from the financial, 
cultural and resource limitations in the PTO that previously led to the 
abandonment of the “fraud squad” in the late 1980’s.
74
  Indeed, the use 
of the PTO to investigate inequitable conduct, as proposed in S. 3818, 
was quickly abandoned during the 109th Congress, and it appears that 
the proposals for USPTO investigations in the Kyl Bill (S. 610) were 
removed in the compromises that led to the Manager’s Amendment.
75
Clearly, the Manager’s Amendment proposals to have the UPTO 
review the claims of a patent through reexamination, so that the withheld 
or correct information or prior art can be considered, has the most 
appeal, although in not all quarters.
76
III. FUTURE PROSPECTS
In legislatively addressing the “plague” of inequitable conduct 
charges routinely made in patent litigation and the perceived imbalance 
of extreme punishment to minor offense or honest mistake that often is 
alleged, while establishing incentives for full and honest 
communications with the PTO during the prosecution of patent 
applications, the Congress faces a broad spectrum of solutions. 
At one end of the spectrum is the status quo, with the Congress 
doing nothing or, perhaps, simply legislating broad definitions of intent 
(negligence) and materiality (reasonable examiner) that reflect some 
showing of “error without deceptive intention,” and may have been viewed as too limited in scope 
for effectively purging inequitable conduct. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1999) (discussing the reissue statute). 
 73. Murphy, supra note 31, at 2296-2302. 
 74. Manbeck, supra note 26, at 139-40. 
 75. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. § 11 (2009). 
 76. Murphy, supra note 31, at 2293-96. 
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recent judicial holdings.  At the opposite end of the spectrum is the 
simple elimination of any punishment for inequitable conduct that is 
short of common law fraud.
77
  A protocol for purging the basis for 
inequitable conduct, coupled with the elimination of most sanctions for 
inequitable conduct, appears to have the greatest support, despite a 
public policy in favor of some form of sanction as a deterrent. 
A. The Manager’s Amendment 
The Manager’s Amendment adds a new § 257 that provides for 
supplemental examinations, at the request of a patent owner, “to 
consider, reconsider or correct information believed to be relevant to the 
patent.”
78
  If information presented in the request raises “a substantial 
new question of patentability,” the Director shall order ex parte 
reexamination of the patent under the existing provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 
302 et seq. on “each substantial new question of patentability identified 
during the supplemental examination.
79
  A key exception is that the 
reexamination will not be limited to patents and printed publications, 
thus permitting the examination of issues based on improper small entity 
claims and erroneous declarations.
80
  Third parties would not be 
permitted to participate, but presumably could submit additional art or 
institute parallel ex parte or inter partes reexamination proceedings that 
could be merged.
81
The effect of a completed reexamination, assuming that original or 
amended claims remain, is that the patent “shall not be held 
unenforceable under § 282 on the basis of conduct relating to 
information that had not been considered, was inadequately considered, 
or was incorrect in a prior examination of the patent if the information 
was considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental 
examination of the patent.”
82
  In effect, this provision would permit a 
patent owner, whether or not involved in the original conduct that 
resulted submitted incomplete or erroneous information before the 
USPTO, to purge the basis for a claim of inequitable conduct.  In fact, it 
 77. See Wasserman, supra note 33, at 16 (advocating a two-tier system of remedies). 
 78. Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, 111th Cong., § 10 (2010), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/PatentReformAmendment.pdf . 
 79. Id.
 80. Id.  Another exception is that the patent owner will not have the right to file a statement 
under § 304.  Id.
 81. Id.
 82. Id.  The statute would expressly provide that the making of the request or the absence of 
such request “shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent under section 282.”  Id.
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would preclude any defense of inequitable conduct should the purge 
occur. 
There are exceptions to such preclusion where allegations of 
inequitable conduct are made in an answer to a complaint or in a 
complaint for declaratory judgment, prior to the request for supplemental 
examination.
83
  In addition, sanctions based on criminal or antitrust laws 
are not precluded nor are investigations by the Director of the USPTO of 
misconduct in proceedings before the USPTO.
84
The Manager’s Amendment did not answer issues related to the 
effect of a purge where the resubmitted or newly submitted information 
is itself incomplete or allegedly erroneous.
85
  Discovery, as to these 
issues, is certain to maintain a prominent role in the strategy for any 
accused infringer.  Thus, the specter of the “plague” appears to remain, 
although, at a lower level.  Further, the true effect of the purge protocol 
as a deterrent or as an invitation to dishonesty before the USPTO would 
require years to identify. 
A more modest proposal that recognizes the complex factual 
situations that arise would grant the courts greater leeway in fashioning 
equitable relief, in such a manner that is appropriate for the proven 
degree of materiality and intent.
86
  Such relief may be temporary or 
permanent. Also, it may reach one or more claims and one or more 
patents.  Other proposals for reform also would take an equitable 
approach but would give greater weight to reducing over-compliance, 
and would tie the legal remedy with the harm that non-disclosure does to 
patent quality, thereby minimizing the remedies for failure to comply 
with the duty of disclosure.
87
Whatever solution Congress fashions, the choice may not be driven 
solely by the desire for higher quality patents, but also may be shaped by 
broader public policies. 
 83. Id.
 84. Id.
 85. See id.
 86. See Murphy, supra note 31, at 2297 (advocating minimum guidelines coupled with 
judicial discretion for three categories of misconduct:  (1) that related to patentability and 
unenforceable claims; (2) that unrelated to patentability; and (3) that demonstrating egregious intent 
to deceive); see also Dolak, supra note 38, at 11. 
 87. Cotropia, supra note 35, at 774-75. 
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